Burundi: When and how would Burundi be equipped with a truly national army and police? (Fourth part)
We saw in our previous edition that in the history of our country, there have been various coup attempts which should, once successful, be accompanied by genocides of the Tutsi digital minority by the numerical Hutu majority. Some Hutu extremists did not understand why what worked in Rwanda in 1959 could not be done in Burundi. That’s why they always tried, until 1972. Planners were still military and politicians, but implementers were still defence and security forces. During this whole period, the Hutus were more numerous within these forces; some would say that the Tutsis did not yet have any interest in enrolling in this institution, which was otherwise demanding, they preferred to go to school for some, and continue breeding for others.
But, already with the first Republic, Micombero’s power began to feel a threat of extermination of Tutsis by Hutu extremists, because he had already seen the various attempts that had been regularly foiled. There was therefore a need for a kind of protection of power, but also of this Tutsi digital minority. And that could only be done by recruiting a lot of Tutsi soldiers. They then began to raise their awareness and interest them so that they could join these forces, as the Hutus did in Mirerekano’s time.
With the events of 1972, witnesses claim that some Hutus who were in the army even killed Tutsi soldiers. The most cited case is of Misigaro who commanded the Nyanzalac camp, who had his Tutsi soldiers killed. During the repression that followed the genocide of the Tutsi in Rumonge, Nyanza lac, Makamba and Bururi, witnesses also say that the Hutu soldiers were used to kill the Hutu civilians gathered, either for meetings or something else; but after this crime, these Hutu soldiers were in turn shot by their Tutsi brothers in arms.
Successive military powers, from Micombero to Buyoya via Bagaza, continued to recruit and strengthen members of the armed forces. This work had a dual objective: to protect the country and its people while ensuring the survival of the Tutsi minority; then protect power and its institutions. And yet, these are the same armed forces that were used to overthrow their powers. This is how the military has always interfered in politics. At least at the officer level, because the other categories were in demand when the coup d’Etat was carried out.
Even though they were operating in a one-party system, the Uprona, the soldiers of the old army (currently called the ex fab), never felt that they were members of this party or had a certain obligation to protect it. Here it should be noted that until a certain period, a certain amount of money was withdrawn from their balance as a contribution within the Uprona party, which was stopped at a certain point, because having understood that they did not have an obligation to this party. To be honest, there was a category of officers who got involved / played politics; it was with this that the coups d’Etat were being prepared. But, the rest of the troops were doing purely professional work without direct influence or interference from orders from politicians. Even if the orders came from above, to the Supreme Commander, these orders would have to follow a well-known hierarchy in order to be carried out.
If it is true that during all military powers the Hutus were few in number compared to the Tutsis, within the defence and security corps, the ethnic problem did not arise until the arrival of political pluralism in Burundi. . With the Frodebu party which had its origins in Rwanda where its leaders were instilled with a divisions ideology, the Hutu soldiers began to feel attached to these leaders (during the electoral campaign leading to the 1993 elections, some Hutu soldiers participated in the meetings in civilians) which taught to want to bring a profound change, passing by the elections. This profound change was nothing but propelling a Hutu to power; in other words, to achieve what they have always failed for a long time; why not arrive at the Rwandan-style social revolution in 1959. The party taught, by the door-to-door method, that the Hutus, being numerous, must win the elections of 1993; otherwise, the Hutus would have to kill all the Tutsis because they would have “stolen their victory”. The 1993 elections went well, there was no cheating, and the ethnic majority won as planned. A victory described as a Hutu over the Tutsis. It remained to be seen how these Hutu leaders of Frodebu, having taught ethnic divisions, would manage this victory because during their electoral campaign, they uttered threats to kill the Tutsis. The terms “niveau ni ugutwi ” implicitly meant hitting the machete at ear level; “Susurutsa” meant that Tutsi houses should be burnt down. This term was used after the victory to say that all Tutsi should be dismissed from positions of responsibility.
This victory of Frodebu over Uprona, implicitly of Hutus over Tutsi (although in Frodebu there were Tutsis and in Uprona there were Hutus), lasted the time of the dew. Three months later, the same military, associated with Uprona politicians, manipulated the armed forces to overthrow democratically elected (others will say ethnically elected) institutions. They did the irreparable by killing like a vulgar man President Ndadaye, who was buried in the front quickly in the fence of Camp Para. He will be unearthed afterwards to bury him with dignity.
On the day of his assassination, all the Hutus of Frodebu and Palipehutu barricaded all the roads with trees cut with chainsaws, destroyed bridges to avoid the intervention of the police. They then committed the genocide as it had been prepared. Anything to say that the Hutus acted with petty anger to justify that it was a simple massacre only denied the genocide. It was meticulously prepared by teaching ideology, setting up equipment (purchasing and distributing chainsaws, machetes and gasoline). Its implementation took place throughout the national territory and at the same time. A president assassinated by a group of soldiers does not mean that it is a crime to be blamed on all Tutsis; which justifies that it was a genocide which had been planned, which was only waiting for a trigger. Remember that the large-scale genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was also started after the death of president Juvenal Havyarimana
URN HITAMWONEZA regrets that the great planners of the assassination of President Ndadaye were not punished; only a few executors were imprisoned. We also regret that many of the planners and executors of the 1993 Tutsi genocide are still at large; they are the same who continue to commit various crimes under the hat of the party in power. It is also unfortunate that the military is still used by politicians to gain and maintain power, which often results in the deaths of innocent citizens. We will continue to cry out so that all those who have committed such crimes will one day be judged and punished to allow the remains of Burundians to live together in peace.
Tomorrow we will talk about the start of the Hutu rebellion in 1994 and how the defence and security corps fought it until the former rebels were integrated into these corps. We will analyse the composition and functioning of the current defence and security corps in Burundi to conclude whether they are really professional bodies or not
